California Phenomenology

Jeff Yoshimi, Clinton Tolley, David Woodruff Smith

Penultimate draft of a paper published in *The Reception of Husserlian Phenomenology in North America.* Editor, Michela Beatrice Ferri.

To the memory of Richard Tieszen.

1. Introduction

"California Phenomenology" in the literal sense (i.e., phenomenological philosophy that has occurred in California) includes Josiah Royce in Grass Valley and Berkeley in the late 19th century, Husserl's job offer at the University of Southern California in 1933, and various members of the Frankfurt School of critical theory who landed in Southern California in the 1930s and 1940s.[1] This is an interesting but heterogeneous collection. In another sense, "California Phenomenology" is a coherent school of thought, what is also referred to as the "California School", "Føllesdal School", "West Coast Phenomenology", or the "Fregean interpretation of Husserl".[2] This will be our focus. California phenomenology in this second sense is characterized by certain core ideas, perhaps most centrally: a semantic objectivist interpretation of Husserl's concept of *noema*, whereby the noema is an abstract meaning entity that mediates perceptual reference and other forms of intentionality, similarly to how Fregean *Sinne* mediate linguistic reference; a broadly realist interpretation of Husserl's ontology; an interest in exploring the links between phenomenology and cognitive science; and an insistence on the importance of putting analytic philosophy into conversation with Husserl and phenomenology more generally. The California school in this sense is associated with a social network, a collection of academics who have participated in an evolving set of informal meetings, seminar series, and conferences.

[1] Royce (who was arguably a precursor to phenomenology) was born in Grass Valley in the North San Joaquin Valley in 1855, got his BA in philosophy at Berkeley, and studied Lotze at Göttingen in the 1870s. In 1933 Husserl received an appointment offer at the University of Southern California, to replace the deceased Croce / Bergson scholar H. Wildon Carr, and to help populate the newly-created philosophy program (Spiegelberg, 1973; Starr, 1991). Husserl declined, since the department could not support his assistants Dorion Cairns and Eugen Fink. Members of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory who ended up in California included Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in the Pacific Palisades near Los Angeles (along with Brecht, Schoenberg, and Mann), and Heidegger's student Herbert Marcuse at UCSD.

[2] Earlier characterizations of this school are in Silverman (1980), Smith (1983), Drummond (1990), Smith and Smith (1995), Welton (2000), and Smith (2013). Also see Livingston (this volume).

As a social network, the California School of phenomenology originates with Dagfinn Føllesdal, who studied mathematics and philosophy in Oslo and at Göttingen in the 1950s, and then wrote a dissertation under Quine at Harvard in 1957-1961. In this period he developed the basic features of his "Fregean" interpretation of Husserl. In 1966 he moved to Stanford (on a split appointment with Oslo), where he and his students further developed these ideas, and produced a series of publications that are closely associated with the "California School". Through the 1980s this group and other interested parties began meeting in California, primarily in the San Francisco Bay Area. In the 1980s the center of gravity moved to Southern California. In the 2000s the informal meetings became more regular, and the group dubbed itself the "California Phenomenology Circle". Meetings of this group continue to be held, primarily in Southern California, mostly centered around UC Irvine. The group also spun off an American Philosophical Association group in 1990, originally "The Society for the Study of Husserl's Philosophy", now "The Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy" (SPAP), which has yearly meetings at the Pacific APA.

2. Føllesdal and The California School in the Bay Area

Dagfinn Føllesdal is a Norwegian-born philosopher who studied mathematics at Oslo and Göttingen (where Husserl had been professor *extraordinarius*) in 1950-1957 and wrote a master's thesis (*Husserl und Frege*) at Oslo in 1956. He discovered Husserl in 1954 while studying mathematics at Göttingen. He became interested in the *Psychologismusstreit* (the 19th century debate over psychologism, roughly: the view that logical and mathematical entities are either mental constructs or simply mental states or activities), and wondered why, among the European historians and philosophers he was reading, Husserl seemed to receive all the credit for ending the debate, when Frege had made similar arguments earlier. It was through detailed study of this conflict, together with his continued interest in mathematics, that the basic ideas behind interpreting Husserl's own views in light of Frege's were formed.[3] Føllesdal has reported on this period of his intellectual development in email correspondence:

> I was reading philosophy as a hobby and noticed that a many-volumed survey of the history of philosophy [i.e, Ueberweg et. al., 1927] devoted a major part of its presentation of late 19th and 20th century philosophy to Husserl, who was praised as the philosopher who put an end to psychologism, which had dominated the last decades of the 19th century.

[3] Føllesdal's work on these issues is in *Husserl und Frege* (1958; Eng. translation in 1994). He has noted that many people mistakenly cite that book as though it contained his Fregean reading of Husserl, when in fact it contains his review of the psychologism debate in relation to Husserl and Frege.

This startled me. Had not Frege, one of my philosophical heroes, tackled psychologism much earlier in several of his writings, including even a review in 1894 of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. However, Frege is barely touched upon in Ueberweg and his criticism of psychologism is not even mentioned. At that time I knew nothing about Husserl. However, the following year Kurt Reidemeister (1893-1971) came to Göttingen, and I started following his lectures on his specialty, the topology of knots. As a young student he had heard Husserl's lectures in Freiburg, and Husserl made him vacillate between going into philosophy or mathematics. Reidemeister remained strongly interested in philosophy and particularly in Husserl. (Another, early, student of Reidemeister's, in Vienna, was Otto Schreier, my later colleague Dana Scott's father-in-law, who died barely 28 years old, in 1929. Together, Schreier and Reidemeister created the so-called "Reidemeister-Schreier method.")

But back to Frege and Husserl. In the fall of 1954 I read Husserl's *Prolegomena*, the first volume of his *Logical Investigations*, where he gives a number of critical arguments against psychologism. I was struck by the similarity between these arguments and those of Frege six years earlier, and I wrote a comparison of their arguments, which showed that many of them had the same basic structure. There were important differences: Husserl was more certain that he had an alternative, namely phenomenology, which he presented in the main volume, volume 2. Frege merely argued that psychologism was an untenable position with several fundamental flaws. Already before Frege wrote his review Husserl had struggled with the second volume of his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. Shortly after Frege's review of volume 1, Husserl gave up his work on this volume, together with his whole psychologistic project and started instead to develop what later became phenomenology. This was presented in 1900 in the two volumes of the *Logical Investigations.* (Having learned from experience, he published the two volumes simultaneously).

The first volume, *Prolegomena*, which contains Husserl's attack on psychologism, contains no reference to Frege. The only mention of Frege in the *Logical Investigations* is a remark in a footnote where Husserl points out that Frege's word *'Bedeutung'* is an unfortunate choice of terminology for what Frege wanted to express. I certainly agree with Husserl on this, but I was disappointed by his lack of generousness to Frege, with whom he had an active correspondence. In conversations it was different. Roman Ingarden told me later that Husserl had said to him "*Freges Bedeutung war entscheidend*" (Frege's impact was decisive.)

I disliked Husserl's unwillingness to give credit to Frege. I also was turned off by the complicated style of his writing. However, I nevertheless found much of interest in the *Logical Investigations*, and gradually I worked my way through the book and found it

more and more interesting. I also started to study his later work and found especially the *Ideas* thought-provoking.

In 1957 Føllesdal went to Harvard to study philosophy. Jaakko Hintikka was also there as a Junior Fellow from 1956 through 1959. Hintikka is credited with launching possible worlds semantics along with Stig Kanger in the mid-1950s, well before the young Saul Kripke arrived at Harvard; Kripke subsequently proved important theorems and helped simplify the presentation of the style of modal semantics. The philosophical ideas had been brewing in the 1940s in Rudolf Carnap and in C. I. Lewis, but it was Hintikka and Kanger who formalized the notions, as Hintikka moved from Carnap's state-descriptions to model sets of sentences that characterized possible worlds. Hintikka also invented the logics of knowledge, belief, and perception in this possible-worlds framework. So Føllesdal and Hintikka were both working on the philosophy of modal logic. Føllesdal wrote his Harvard dissertation on the semantics of modality, with Quine as his advisor. Føllesdal argued against the Quinean view that quantified necessity statements are logically incoherent, and showed that the logic was workable (at the price of Aristotelian essentialism, Quine then held).

It was within this logical milieu that Føllesdal developed the main lines of his Fregean approach to Husserl, drawing on Frege's notion of 'sense [*Sinn*]' as a way of understanding Husserl's conception of intentionality more generally. Føllesdal grew increasingly focused on the historical development of the idea of objective semantical content as it is articulated from Bolzano to Frege to Husserl. For his part, Hintikka took a complementary approach to the theory of meaning, with a possible-worlds explication of what can be called the "semantical-intentional force" of *Sinn*, where a sense presenting an object is modeled as a function that picks out that object in each relevant possible world.

In the spring of 1961 Føllesdal received his Ph.D. and began teaching at Harvard. He taught a course on Husserl which began with seven lectures on Bolzano, who was largely unknown at the time. Føllesdal recalls that the course was attended by some notable students:

> One of the participants in the course knew German and wrote excellent English and he translated the basic philosophical passages that we needed into English. This was the filmmaker Terry Malick, whose multi-perspective films I often use to illustrate phenomenological issues, among them the notion of perspective.[4] He is not only a good filmmaker but was also one of the best students I ever taught. One of the other students in the course, David Lewis, became so fascinated with Bolzano that he wrote his paper on Bolzano, but he also did very well on his exam, which was on Husserl. Also, several

[4] Robert Tragesser remembers later seeing a Malick film with some of the original Harvard group: "[In] the summer of 1975, in a large seminar at Stanford on the Husserlian 'reductions' led by Føllesdal and Dreyfus, I became aware of the Harvard group [Føllesdal, Parsons, Dreyfus, Todes, all of whom Tragesser had read or met separately] and the conflicts among them over the soundness of core Husserlian theses. Interestingly, Terrence Malick's film *Badlands* was showing in Palo Alto, and the seminar went to watch and then discuss it."

> other students combined work on Husserl with excellent work in other fields. I repeated this course three years in a row, and decided also to teach a course on Heidegger. This was attended by Stanley Cavell, who came to Harvard during my last year there and who later also taught Heidegger, but from a quite different perspective than my Husserl-oriented one.

These ideas were first publicly presented in 1969, when Føllesdal gave a talk on Husserl at the Eastern APA in New York. He presented his twelve theses concerning the noema. This would later become his famous paper, "Husserl's Notion of Noema" (Føllesdal, 1969), which is arguably the *locus classicus* of California phenomenology.

One of Føllesdal's first Ph.D. students was Hubert Dreyfus (Ph.D Harvard, 1964). Dreyfus wrote a dissertation on Husserl: "Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception: From Transcendental to Existential Phenomenology" (1964). He generally accepted Føllesdal's reading of Husserl, and later used it to develop a reading of Husserl as "the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence" (Dreyfus and Hall, 1982, p. 2).[5] In this way Dreyfus was able to treat Heidegger's critique of Husserl as an indirect critique of AI. Today Dreyfus is best known both for his Heideggerean critique of AI (Dreyfus, 1992) and for his reading of Heidegger (Dreyfus, 1991), which has given rise to its own social network, which originally met primarily in California.[6] Thus one of the first to read Husserl from a Føllesdalian perspective (and sympathetically) would later become a critic of Husserl. Dreyfus also introduced Føllesdal to Aron Gurwitsch's work (he had been a colleague of Dreyfus at Brandeis and had moved to the New School in 1959). According to Føllesdal, "Gurwitsch and I differed in our interpretations of Husserl mainly on two points, the notions of the noema and the hyle, and I found the discussions with him very well focused, with proper attention to arguments and to the texts."

Another early Føllesdal student was Samuel Todes, whose dissertation, *The Human Body as Material Subject of the World* (1963), was reprinted in 1990 and 2001 (Todes, 2001). At Harvard Føllesdal was in close contact with Dreyfus, Todes, and also Charles Parsons, and the three met regularly to discuss phenomenology. Parsons went on to become a famous philosopher of mathematics, and would remain close to Føllesdal, given their mutual interests in phenomenological approaches to mathematics and logic.

In 1966 Føllesdal joined the faculty at Stanford—where Hintikka had been since 1965—and taught there until his retirement in 2013. Two of his first and best known students at Stanford were David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, who completed their dissertations in 1970. In their first year at Stanford (1966), they took Hintikka's theory of knowledge course, Pat Suppes'

---

[5] Critical discussion of this idea is in (McIntyre, 1986) and (Yoshimi, 2009).

[6] At the Asilomar Conference Grounds in Monterrey (sometimes referred to informally as the "Asilomor meetings"). This group is now known as the International Society for Phenomenological Studies. See https://sites.google.com/site/ispsphenomenology/. Participants in this group, some of whom are also mentioned in this paper, include Sean Kelly, Mark Wrathall, Taylor Carman, David Cerbone, Wayne Martin, and Iain Thompson.

course in philosophy of science, and Donald Davidson's philosophy of language course. As Smith recalls: Davidson's course was "a *tour de force*, and introduced Davidson's own take on Tarskian truth-definitions as capturing meaning. So, when Dagfinn arrived the following year with his Husserl course, just think of the rich background Ron and I had. And historical work too." They went on to write dissertations on various aspects of meaning in Husserl. Smith's dissertation (with Føllesdal and Hintikka as co-advisors) was "The role of individuation in Husserl's theory of intentionality", and McIntyre's (with Hintikka as main advisor) was "The role of the noema as an intensional entity." Smith and McIntyre went on to extend Føllesdal's reading of Husserl in a book-length work, *Husserl and Intentionality* (1982), which became closely associated with the Fregean interpretation of Husserl. Smith recalls some of the details of the book in relation to Føllesdal and Hintikka:

> I was taken with the parallel to the problem of quantifying into contexts such as "∃x(A sees that x is F)", as in Hintikka's 1967 essay "On the Logic of Perception". Husserl's determinable X in the *Sinn* seemed an anticipation of just that notion, and lots of my later writings, including *The Circle of Acquaintance* (Smith, 1989) develop that notion. Anyway, during the 1970s Ron and I then extended our respective ideas so that the first half of *Husserl and Intentionality* (Smith and McIntyre, 1982) concerned broadly Fregean *Sinn*, and the second half of the book concerned possible-worlds explication of the horizon of an experience with a Sinn. Like that. You can see the convergence of influences from Dagfinn and from Jaakko. And the whole idea of sense as a function from worlds to extensions was much in the air through the 1960s. Dana Scott at Stanford, professor of mathematics and of philosophy, was an influential mathematical logician helping to shape the development of modal logics. I took/audited his wonderful course on modal logic, TA'd by Krister Segerberg (another fine Nordic, Swedish logician).

A decade later, in 1979, Izchak (Isaac) Miller was at UCLA doing work in phenomenology. Since UCLA did not have anybody working on phenomenology, the department supported Miller's regular travel to Stanford, where Føllesdal was one of his thesis advisors. His dissertation, *Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness*, written under Føllesdal and Keith Donnellan, was later published by MIT (Miller, 1984). According to Føllesdal, "Izchak's book became a bestseller, it was the most sold philosophy book the year it came out." Miller also substituted for Føllesdal at Stanford when he was on sabbatical leave. According to Føllesdal Fred Dretske attended and enjoyed Miller's lectures and was generally supportive.

The philosopher and mathematician Robert Tragesser (Rice Ph.D., 1967)[7], drew on Føllesdal's interpretation of intentionality in developing his own phenomenological work in

[7] Tragesser has described the background of his graduate work and how he was eventually led towards Stanford: "By the fall of 1963, I was seeking a graduate school where I could pursue developing my understanding of Husserlian phenomenology and applying it to the solution of problems I was finding in

logic, mathematics and perception (Tragesser 1977, 1984)[8]. He had been invited to teach summer courses at Stanford as early as the late 1960s. He recalls:

> Because of his joint appointment with Oslo, and because his home was there, I rarely encountered Føllesdal at Stanford. In 1969 I was invited to give two courses in the summer, one on introductory logic, the other on Husserl. It was the first time I had talks with Føllesdal. I had a long lunch at some point with Føllesdal and Hintikka, where I learned of Hintikka's interest in Husserl. [Georg] Kreisel was there and I was quite involved with him. Michael Dummett was also there, giving a seminar on Frege and having discussions with Kreisel on technical matters, and ideas with respect to intuitionistic logic. Michael Sukale was my T.A... [I found] Smith and McIntyre's later long paper (Smith and McIntyre, 1971) as well as their book (Smith and McIntyre, 1982) helpful, their clear and substantial explications of Husserl's ideas useful as starting points, and as good elaborations of Føllesdal's understanding of Husserlian intentionality.

It is interesting to note that most of these philosophers had backgrounds in mathematics or science. When Føllesdal arrived at Harvard, the fellowship office thought he was to be in the mathematics department, but they transferred his support to the philosophy department, as he was to work with Quine. Dreyfus' undergrad major was physics. Smith's undergraduate major was mathematics, in an Engineering Sciences program (Northwestern's Technological Institute). McIntyre's undergraduate major was in physics at Wake Forest; he was in grad school in physics at Florida State before changing to philosophy; then moved on to Stanford in philosophy (thanks

---

the philosophy of mathematics and logic. All the signs were that Marvin Farber--the author of *Foundations of Phenomenology* (Farber, 1943) who had befriended Ernst Zermelo, [and] attended Husserl's lectures with Zermelo--was the person to work with. But I learned from him that he was no longer working in these areas. He suggested that I approach James Street Fulton, who had a masters degree in mathematics and was a serious thinker about Husserl's philosophy. Hence my ending up at Rice University. As helpful as Fulton was in developing my understanding of Husserl (he for example gave me tutorials where we read *Formal und Transzendentale Logik*, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, etc. together) I did not have much help in the foundations of logic and mathematics. I'd heard from a number of people who had talked with Gödel, that he had been recommending that they read Husserl, the 'they' being such celestial, somewhat philosophically minded, mathematical logicians as Robert Solovay, John Myhill, W.W.Tait, Solomon Feferman, ... Speaking with Gödel in any sense was out of the question. A number of people mentioned Georg Kreisel as someone having extensive discussions and correspondence with Gödel and whose ideas about foundations had influenced and been pursued by Kreisel. Kreisel was at Stanford and Fulton was supportive of me spending summers at Stanford to take advantage of Kreisel, for he was staying at Stanford and, indeed, there were quite advanced seminars in mathematical logic going on in the summers. Dana Scott and Solomon Feferman were also around. It was the heyday of west-coast genuinely avant garde mathematical logic; it was a very special time and place (e.g., Jon Barwise was a graduate student)."

[8] Tragesser notes that Føllesdal read through a late draft of *Phenomenology and Logic* (Tragesser, 1977) and urged him to put his discussion of Gödel first. In fact, that book may have been the first to make a connection between Gödel and Husserl. Tragesser recalls that "at the time it was treated with much skepticism, in contrast to the sudden burst [of interest in the topic] in the late 1980s".

to the influence of Brian Chellas, an FSU graduate and Stanford grad student who taught logic and philosophy of language at FSU in summer 1965).

This group of philosophers – primarily Føllesdal, Smith, McIntyre, and Miller – became associated with the California school of Husserl interpretation. There are two main features associated with this group: (1) a general emphasis on the fruitfulness of exploring the relationship between Husserl and analytic philosophy, and (2) a reading of Husserl as developing a semantic theory that can be viewed as a kind of generalization of Fregean semantics, from language to consciousness.[9]

(1) The emphasis on Husserl in relation to analytic philosophy occurred at several levels. First, Husserl was understood as himself being an early analytic philosopher, a point which is now generally recognized (*Logical Investigations,* for example, is clearly analytic in tone and content). Second, Husserl's views were interpreted and developed by placing them in explicit conversation with debates in analytic philosophy: Føllesdal wrote his dissertation on the semantics of names and other referring expressions; Smith, McIntyre, and Miller wrote dissertations connecting Husserlian phenomenology with philosophy of mind and language.[10] Finally, Husserl scholarship was pursued using a clear formal style. The 12 numbered theses at the core of Føllesdal (1969) are a case in point. None of these features is unique to the early California School[11]—indeed, many Husserl scholars today strive for clarity and recognize Husserl as a kind of analytic philosopher—but they are nonetheless prototypical features of the group.

(2) Reading the noema as "an intensional entity, a generalization of the notion of meaning (*Sinn*, *Bedeutung*)" (Føllesdal, 1969, thesis 1). This takes the form of a mapping from the technical terminology of Husserlian phenomenology (meaning, noema; objectivity) to the terms of a broadly Fregean semantics (sense; reference). This is also associated with a realist reading of Husserl's views on ontology (the 'objectivities' meant or referred to in intentional mental phenomena), though, of course, realist approaches to Husserlian phenomenology go back to Husserl's own time. The systematic, specifically "Fregean reading" of Husserl, however, originates with Føllesdal. This is perhaps what is most closely associated with the California school, and it is this that generated the most controversy among those working in phenomenology at the time.

---

[9] Ron McIntyre adds an important qualification here: "we do not claim that Husserl adopted Frege's semantics and generalized it to apply to all intentional acts. The connection is conceptual rather than historical. Husserl developed his own semantics, which had important similarities to and differences from Frege's, and he generalized his notion of meaning and its role in reference to intentionality in general."

[10] This is reflected in the early social network associated with this group. Indeed, the list of people personally associated with the meetings and projects of the early California school comprise a veritable who's-who of 20th century analytic philosophy: Quine, Hintikka, Lewis, Davidson, Sellars, Rorty, Armstrong, Searle, Donnellan, and Dretske, among others.

[11] An overview of analytic approaches to phenomenology outside of California--which extends at least back to the 1950s, if not earlier--is in Smith (2013), pp. 395ff. Important figures include Jitendra Mohanty, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, Jeff Bell, A.D. Smith, and Richard Cobb-Stevens, among many others, especially more recently.

Other projects associated with the early California School include Smith on Husserl in relation to indexical sense and reference (Smith, 1981), Smith and McIntyre on horizons in relation to possible worlds semantics (Smith and McIntyre, 1982), Smith and McIntyre on intentionality in relation to the *de re* / *de dicto* distinction (McIntyre, 1982, Smith and McIntyre, 1982), Miller's formalization of time consciousness (1984), McIntyre on Husserl in relation to Searle (McIntyre, 1984) and McIntyre on Husserl in relation to the representational theory of mind (McIntyre, 1986).[12]

One indication of the impact of the early California School is that when the journal *Husserl Studies* (which continues to be the main outlet for Husserl interpretation) was launched in 1984, under the editorship of Mohanty and Schuhmann[13], almost every volume contained some item relating to the work of Føllesdal and those he influenced.[14]

The identity of the group in this era was associated with a kind of "West-Coast / East-Coast" debate in Husserl interpretation. The debate has interesting origins. As noted above, Føllesdal came to know of Gurwitsch through Dreyfus, and the two had a productive intellectual relationship, despite differences in their readings of Husserl, in particular concerning hyletic data and the noema. The latter debate is what became prominent. On the Fregean interpretation, the noema is an abstract entity that mediates between acts of reference and objects, whose (ideal) existence is independent of both the acts and the objects in question. On what Smith calls the "orthodox Gurwitschean interpretation" (Smith, 1983, p. 249)[15], the noema is the intended object itself (as presented from a certain perspective), and the object as a whole is a system of such noemata.

What was remarkable about this early debate was that Husserl's own language seemed ambiguous enough to permit both interpretations. As Dreyfus says, "there is a systematic ambiguity running through the whole constellation of noema terminology" (H. Dreyfus, 1982, p. 98). In fact, the ambiguity is such that when Gurwitsch was first presented with Føllesdal's reading at the 1969 Eastern APA, and asked to comment, he said he agreed with everything Føllesdal said.[16] Later interpreters would, however, focus the disagreement, and this stands as

---

[12] There is also the issue of Husserl vs. Gurwitsch on hyletic data, which Føllesdal reports as a live question between them. Though both discuss hyletic data in print (Gurwitsch 1964, pp. 265ff; Føllesdal, 1982), there has been little or no published discussion of their differences on the issue.

[13] Jitendra Nath Mohanty received his Ph.D. at Göttingen and is one of the best-known Husserl scholars today. Karl Schuhmann is well-known for his work at the Husserl archives and for editing some of the most important primary texts relating to Husserl, including Husserl's 10-volume correspondence.

[14] Volume 1: review of Smith and McIntyre (Drummond, 1984). Volume 2: Drummond on Frege's influence on Husserl (Drummond, 1985) and reviews of Miller (McKenna, 1985) and Dreyfus' edited volume (Langsdorf, 1985). Volume 3: "Husserl's Phenomenology and Possible Worlds Semantics: A Reexamination" (Harvey, 1986). Volume 5: review of Tragesser (Willard, 1998). Volume 6: review of an edited volume containing contributions by McIntyre, Smith, and others in the California school, as well as philosophers of mind and cognitive science (Tieszen, 1989).

[15] Smith, following Dreyfus, associates this reading with Cairns, Schutz, Boehm, and Fink.

[16] Yoshimi asked Smith, McIntyre, and Føllesdal about this event via email, and received the following responses. David Woodruff Smith: "As I recall, Dagfinn presented his seminal 'Husserl's Notion of Noema' paper at the APA Eastern, perhaps in New York, shortly then published in *Journal of Philosophy*

one of the major controversies in Husserl scholarship. In fact, several bibliographies of noema scholarship have been published (Kersey, 1983-4; Daniel, 2010), which contain numerous references to the Gurwitsch / California school controversy. The most detailed examination of the debate is probably Drummond (1990). A concise enumeration and summary of the main positions in the debate is in Smith and Smith (1995), p. 22ff.

The East-Coast West-coast division had other facets as well. For example, Drummond (1985) questioned whether Frege influenced Husserl as much as he took Føllesdal and his students to suggest.[17] On another front, Welton (1983, 2000) worried that analytic approaches to Husserl (though "insightful, precise, and strong" and responsible for pushing "Husserl studies beyond its earlier phase of exegesis and appropriation into one of detailed critical engagement"; 2000, p. 393), did not pay sufficient attention to the totality of Husserl's research output, and in particular later texts emphasizing dynamic or genetic processes. Separately, there may have been some general hesitation about analytic approaches to Husserl in light of the sense at the time of a broader analytic / continental divide. However, by the 2000s, any concept of a geographically salient East Coast / West Coast division (if there ever really was one) in Husserl studies seemed to have dissolved, though of course specific interpretive and philosophical controversies persist.

3. California Phenomenology beyond the Bay Area

(Føllesdal, 1969). Gurwitsch was in the audience. Someone asked Gurwitsch how he saw things, and Gurwitsch said he agreed with Dagfinn's interpretation. Dagfinn told us, later, that although he thought there were differences, that was not the time to say so. And the rest is history!" Ron McIntyre: "Here's how I remember it, much as Dave does. It was the APA in NY. Topic was Dagfinn's 'Husserl's Notion of Noema', with Dreyfus as either co-speaker or commentator. Bert took up each of Dagfinn's theses, one by one, arguing that each was ambiguous between two readings. One reading gives Dagfinn's account; the other gives Gurwitsch's (Bert claimed). At the very start of the question period, the moderator noted that Gurwitsch was in the audience and called on him to say a few words. I don't remember what else he said, but I do recall his saying, "I agree with everything Professor Føllesdal has said!" ... Later Dave and I asked Dagfinn what he thought of that. Dagfinn, smiling, said something like, 'I don't think there's nearly as much agreement as Gurwitsch does, but I didn't think that was the time to say so.' Later I asked Bert the same question. He said, 'That Dagfinn — he's too damn nice!' Dagfinn Føllesdal: "The noema paper was presented at an Eastern Division meeting and I think that Ron's report from this meeting is probably right, especially since he is able to remember so many details. I cannot recall Gurwitsch from that meeting. Bert knew him well and he brought us together. I remember that at these small meetings we discussed Gurwitsch's interpretation of hyle. Gurwitsch argued that hyle can be re-identified from act to act, so that acts with different noemata can have the same hyle. I argued against his view, appealing both to passages from Husserl and to systematic considerations. However, given that Ron seems to have a much better memory than I have, I am sure that he is right in what he says about the APA meeting."

[17] These topics were discussed at an Eastern APA symposium in 1987 on "Husserl and Frege", which Drummond attended, and which focused on competing conceptions of the noema.

While the Bay Area (Stanford in particular) was the center of the California school during the 1960s-1980s, during the same period like-minded approaches to phenomenology were developing elsewhere in the state. In the 1970s some of Føllesdal's students accepted positions in Southern California, and began to collaborate with existing groups at USC, UCSD, and elsewhere. Regular regional meetings eventually emerged, and the present-day community coalesced. In this section we describe some of these developments. In doing so we further illustrate the diverse interests and general analytic tendencies of these phenomenologists.

The earliest informal gatherings associated with what became the California School occurred in the 1960s, between Føllesdal, Todes, Parsons, and Dreyfus at Harvard. When Føllesdal and Dreyfus moved to the San Francisco Bay Area—Føllesdal to Stanford in 1966, and Dreyfus to Berkeley in 1968—their interactions continued. Searle, Davidson and others were also involved in the informal meetings. In the late 1960s Smith and McIntyre began graduate work at Stanford and organized meetings around their dissertation research. Hintikka and historian John D. Goheen also participated, as did doctoral students John Ladd and Michael Sukale. Hugh Silverman was also at Stanford in this period, and sometimes joined the discussions.[18]

At Berkeley, Dreyfus and John Searle began their decades-long critical dialogue on issues relating to meaning, intentionality, consciousness, and the relationship between phenomenology and analytic philosophy (Dreyfus 1999; Searle, 2005). They were joined by Hans Sluga in 1970, who offered another complementary perspective on the significance of phenomenology (Heidegger especially), drawing on expertise in both the history of early analytic philosophy as well as other turn-of-the-century German intellectual traditions. As dissertation advisors, Dreyfus and Sluga went on to leave their mark on many of the leading phenomenologists in America, including the Heidegger scholar Mark Wrathall (Ph.D. 1996) who returned to southern California in 2007 as a professor at UC Riverside.

Interest in the intersection of phenomenology and analytic philosophy was also emerging downstate at this time. Dallas Willard joined the University of Southern California in 1965,[19] and set to work developing an interpretation of Husserl that was in many ways similar to Føllesdal's. For example, both took Husserl's anti-psychologism in logic, math, and semantics to be strikingly parallel to Frege's (at the time) more well-known views (Willard, 1986). Willard was also active as a translator, editor, and interpreter of Husserl's early writings on logic and

[18] Silverman later moved to SUNY Stony Brook and is well known today for his many contributions to Continental philosophy in America, having served for example in the leadership of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) in the 1980s

[19] As noted in the opening, USC has a history with Husserl, including a correspondence between a graduate student (E. Parl Welch) and Husserl in the early 1930s, and a subsequent job offer (Spiegelberg, 1973).

arithmetic (See Husserl 1994, 2012). He has become associated with an "Aristotelian" reading of Husserl[20], and is well-known as a theologian.

Phenomenology also took root at UC San Diego in the late 1960s. Herbert Marcuse, who had studied with Heidegger, came to the department in 1966. In 1971 Frederick Olafson joined the faculty, teaching and writing about Husserl and Heidegger from a point of view informed by the analytic philosophy of mind of the period (Olafson 1967, 1987, 1995). He also entered into a minor controversy with Dreyfus concerning the proper interpretation of Heidegger (Olafson 1994). Robert Pippin came to UCSD in 1975, where he developed his neo-Sellarsian approach to Heidegger's phenomenology (and to modern German philosophy more broadly).

David Smith arrived at UC Irvine in 1973 and McIntyre joined the faculty at CSU Northridge in 1977. Through the 1980s Smith, McIntyre, and Miller would periodically return to the Bay Area to meet with Føllesdal and others, including John Searle, John Haugeland (Ph.D. from Berkeley in 1976 under Sluga, and, like Dreyfus, interested in Heidegger and AI) and eventually Richard Tieszen (appointed at San Jose State University in 1989; more below). Other analytic philosophers would join these discussions occasionally, e.g., Barry Stroud and Fred Dretske.

In 1980 Dreyfus and Haugeland organized an NEH Summer Institute at UC Berkeley, "Phenomenology and Existentialism: Continental and Analytic Perspectives on Intentionality." This was a seminal moment for the group. It brought together for the first time in a deliberate and cooperative way leading figures from the Continental and analytic traditions: lecturers and speakers included John Searle, Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, Rudiger Bubner, David Carr, John Compton, Arthur Danto, Dreyfus, Føllesdal, Harrison Hall, Haugeland, Albert Hofstader, David Hoy, McIntyre, J. N. Mohanty, Frederick Olafson, Paul Rabinow, Wilfrid Sellars, and Smith. Charles Taylor was also a presence in discussions with Dreyfus and Searle. Around the same time Dreyfus and David Hoy also arranged a workshop with Taylor at UC Santa Cruz.

Richard Tieszen — an authority on phenomenology in relation to logic and mathematics (Tieszen, 2005), and on Gödel in relation to Husserl (Tieszen, 1992 and 2011) — studied philosophy on the East Coast and was in touch with some of the people Føllesdal had worked with at Harvard.[21] He received his Ph.D. at Columbia under Charles Parsons in 1986, and while there, began reading "West coast" phenomenology: "at Columbia I was basically trained in

---

[20] This approach is shared by Barry Smith, Kevin Mulligan, Walter Hopp and, according to Hopp, "probably the majority of the Göttingen and Munich phenomenologists".

[21] "Before going to Columbia I got an M.A., (1978) in philosophy at the New School, Graduate Faculty. This perhaps would have put me in the 'New School' or 'East Coast' lineage, except I was already reading Føllesdal and the work of David Smith, Ron McIntyre, Izchak Miller, and John Ladd. At the New School I studied Husserl with Mohanty and then, the next year, with Izchak Miller (Izchak's time book). I moved to Columbia to work with Parsons because I could not get enough logic and foundations of math at the New School. Parsons was open to working on Husserl. He gave a seminar on Husserl's *Logical Investigations* my first term at Columbia, which made me feel right at home. Parsons's main teachers were all at Harvard: Quine, Dreben, and Wang. So I have a bit of a mixed lineage because I wanted to do phenomenology and logic/phil. of math. Incidentally, I later learned that Dagfinn and Charles were friends from their earlier years together at Harvard."

analytic philosophy, but I was reading a lot of analytically oriented phenomenology on my own, thanks to the writings of Dagfinn, David, Ron, and Izchak that began to appear." He recalls:

> After I arrived in the Bay area in the Fall of '89 there were meetings at Stanford and UC Berkeley. Izchak was here for a while, and David and Ron would drive up for meetings when Dagfinn was at Stanford. There would usually be a few students in tow at the meetings. I remember gatherings in Berkeley with Dreyfus (on more than one occasion) and with Searle (one or two occasions). Most meetings were at Stanford. Sometimes visitors from abroad would participate, e.g., Christian Beyer. Meetings were informal, with lots of good discussion and analysis, always good-natured and friendly. If we met in the Southland, Dallas Willard would appear. On one occasion a conference was set up at a spa/resort near San Luis Obispo [the 2008 conference mentioned below]--we met each other halfway. That was a wonderful conference. Later, we had a conference on phenomenology at SJSU.

In the late 1980s the group began holding more meetings in Southern California.[22] Smith was at UCI, McIntyre was at CSUN, Miller was visiting at UCLA, and Willard was at USC. In the early 1990s, the group was joined by Allan Casebier, a Ph.D. in philosophy from Michigan serving as a faculty member in the USC cinema department, working on philosophy and phenomenology of film (cf. Casebier, 1991). Casebier helped organize meetings on phenomenology, with a core of Smith, McIntyre, Willard, and frequent visits by Miller. Casebier liked the mix of analytic and phenomenological methods: "I then could not and still cannot conceive of pursuing a philosophical inquiry except in an analytic way, though questions arise in phenomenological theory that would not be encountered in analytic philosophy. The intersection of analytic and phenomenological methods was an inevitable direction for the society given my outlook/ approaches". Others in the region joined in, including Martin Schwab at UC Irvine, working on continental philosophy broadly, with interests in film, Kant, and Nietzsche, as well as Husserl and Derrida (cf. Schwab, 1986; 2000); and Arthur Szylewicz at Moorpark College, an astute translator of Husserl and Ingarden (cf. Ingarden and Szylewicz, 2013). Casebier recalls a

[22] Not all meetings were in Southern California in this period. Tieszen, Smith, McIntyre, and others continued to meet in the Bay Area periodically. Other notable collaborations also occurred in the Bay area in this period. In the mid-1990s Christian Beyer spent time at Stanford, working with Føllesdal on phenomenology and philosophy of language. He later worked with Føllesdal at Oslo and is now professor in Göttingen, where Husserl had also been professor and where Føllesdal had first been introduced to Husserl's ideas. His ideas are informed by his work with Føllesdal and communications with Smith and others. He has done work on Husserl in relation to Bolzano (Beyer, 2013), Russell (Beyer, 1998), Searle (Beyer, 1997), and philosophy of language (Beyer 2000, 2003, 2011), and is author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Husserl (Beyer, 2015). Beyer (1997) is also notable for being perhaps the first to refer in print to passages where Husserl suggests a twin-Earth type of thought experiment, decades before Putnam had. In addition to Beyer, Føllesdal also notes: "Another philosopher who spent some time at Stanford working on Husserl is Denis Fisette, now Professor of Philosophy at Université du Québec à Montréal and founder and for many years editor of the journal *Philosophiques*."

discussion of Husserl on universals at UCLA with Julius Moravcsik and D.W. Armstrong. This group met at least quarterly in the early 1990s before Casebier left USC for the University of Miami. Other visitors at UC Irvine in the early 1990s included David Armstrong, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, and Kevin Mulligan.

Amie Thomasson was in graduate school at Irvine with Smith as her advisor at this time, and became involved in meetings as she was writing her dissertation on Ingarden and the ontology of art works (UCI Ph.D. 1995). She has developed Husserlian and phenomenological themes in studies of art objects and works of fiction (Thomasson, 1996, 1999), consciousness (Thomasson, 2003) and historical work on analytic philosophy in relation to phenomenology (Thomasson, 2002). She recalls: "I went to the meetings regularly during my time in Irvine (1989-1995), and it was my first chance to participate in a philosophical group, and to present my work. It was a great, supportive environment and I was proud to be a part of it".

In this period, Casebier proposed and instituted an APA group, the "Society for the Study of Husserl's Philosophy", which would later become the Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy, or SPAP (an allusion to SPEP). Here is his account of its founding:

> I gained approval for an inaugural session of the society to be held at the Boston APA in 1990. In the next Central and Pacific division meetings in 1991, the society found a place in those division's group meetings. At our first meeting in 1990 in Boston, I was chair with J.N. Mohanty, David Smith, and Dallas Willard as speakers. Though the APA organizers approved the new Husserl society meetings, they cautioned that it was not clear whether there would be much interest. Contrary to these expectations, we had 100 in attendance for the first meeting. I had thought it might be useful to have a national structure to oversee the meetings of the society at the various APA divisions. I approached J.N. Mohanty about being President and Suzanne Cunningham being Vice President. I would be secretary. We functioned in these capacities for a while, but then we left it up to the divisional societies to function on their own. After a while, the Pacific division society morphed into a society for phenomenology and analytic philosophy. It was a most felicitous move. The other divisional societies eventually phased out of existence. At the Pacific division society as newly conceived we had a session with Amie Thomasson of my University of Miami department, and John Searle of the host UC Berkeley department speaking about intersections between Searle's work and that of Husserl, with 135 in attendance, a real highlight.[23] Some of the best philosophers working in phenomenology and in analytic philosophy have participated over the years in the Pacific meetings.

[23] The APA symposium was held in 2003, chaired by David Woodruff Smith and titled, "The Role of Phenomenology in Philosophy of Mind"; Speakers were John Searle, Hubert Dreyfus, Ronald McIntyre, and Amie Thomasson.

The Pacific division society morphed into SPAP, with David Smith as lead organizer. SPAP continues to hold annual sessions.

In the early 1990s, Pierre Keller joined the UC Riverside department, working on the interpretation of Husserl and Heidegger on questions of intentionality, temporality, and experience, from a point of view that strove to put these authors in dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind (Keller, 1999). A decade later, UCR made two appointments which expanded their profile in phenomenology: Charles Siewert (Berkeley Ph.D. under Searle, 1994) joined UCR in 2004, developing a neo-phenomenological approach to contemporary debates in philosophy of mind about consciousness and phenomenality (Siewert, 1998, 2005), before moving to Rice in 2010; Mark Wrathall, the Heidegger scholar and Dreyfus student (cf. Dreyfus and Wrathall 2008; Wrathall 2010), joined in 2007.

In 1993 Wayne Martin, then primarily a scholar of German Idealism, joined the faculty at UC San Diego and became involved in the group's meetings:

> Around about 1996, after publishing my first book (on Fichte [Martin, 1997]), I was getting started in earnest on post-Ph.D. research projects, and looking ahead to what, in the German system, would have been my "Habilitation." I was interested in studying Husserl, about whom I knew very little first hand. Dave Cerbone said something that prompted me to start with the *Prolegomena* to the *Logical Investigations*, and I gave a seminar in about 1997. In preparation for that seminar, I hired a summer RA (Peter Thielke, the Maimon scholar, now at Pomona) to help me survey the existing literature on Husserl, particularly as bearing on themes from the *Logical Investigations*. Every day that summer I tried to read four or five articles, and we developed a system for cataloging and sorting the results. At the end of that I had a list of what, over the course of that summer, emerged as the best (in my idiosyncratic opinion) and most useful (given my interests) pieces of recent research. When, at the end of the summer, I surveyed that final list, I was surprised to discover that a significant subset of those articles (and a couple of the books) were written by people who happened to live and work (more-or-less) on my doorstep (at least by Southern California standards). So I wrote to the one who was nearest (David Woodruff Smith). After our first conversation he decided to reconvene the institution of The Circle. We started with a meeting with perhaps six of us in David Smith's back garden, in which I (at Smith's prompting) reported on my research on Fichte's approach to the theory of objective representational content. The people I recall being in attendance were David Woodruff Smith, Ron McIntyre, Drew Cross (who was working on Kierkegaard at UCI at the time) and a couple of Ph.D. students whose names I have forgotten. Were you there? [The question was addressed to Jeff Yoshimi, who was in fact there.]

Jeff Yoshimi began graduate work on Husserl and cognitive science at UC Irvine in the mid 1990s. Yoshimi had been an undergraduate working with Searle and Dreyfus at Berkeley,

and came to Irvine with an interest in Gurwitsch (to whom Dreyfus had referred him, as he had with Føllesdal years earlier). At Irvine he used the California School approach to formalize certain concepts in Husserl and Gurwitsch, and related these ideas to contemporary accounts of the dynamics of neural activity (cf. Yoshimi, 2011, 2012; Yoshimi and Vinson 2015). He was subsequently a postdoc at UC San Diego working with Martin and the Churchlands on "neuro-phenomenology", and in 2004 was a founding faculty member at UC Merced, where he has helped build the cognitive science and philosophy programs. While Yoshimi was finishing his dissertation (Ph.D. 2001) he approached Smith about formalizing the erstwhile meetings (which were continuing from Casebier's time). In 2001 he began organizing regular meetings, primarily in Southern California. Since that time the group has met 2 to 4 times a year, hosting talks with many of the original participants, their graduate students, and other like-minded philosophers who have spent time writing and teaching in the area. Meetings were held at UC Irvine, CSU Northridge, USC, UC San Diego, UC Riverside, and often in people's living rooms. In this period, the "California Phenomenology Circle" took root as the informal organization's name.[24]

Several small conferences affiliated with this group also occurred, including two meetings at Cal Poly San Luis Obispo (2007 and 2008), co-hosted by Yoshimi and Joseph Schear. Schear was then at Cal Poly (he has since moved to Oxford), working on intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, from a standpoint that views them as cooperative (Schear, forthcoming), and the Dreyfus / McDowell debate concerning the content of perception (Schear, 2013). He was initially an undergraduate at UCSD working with Wayne Martin (with whom he wrote an honor's thesis on French philosophy of science) and Taylor Carman, who had worked with Føllesdal and Dreyfus while getting his Ph.D. at Stanford, and who was visiting UCSD at the time. Schear went on to get his Ph.D. at Chicago, with a dissertation on Heidegger under Pippin (who had by then moved from UCSD to Chicago) and Haugeland. Other mini-conferences in the area were convened, including a one-day conference at UC Riverside in 2009, organized by Mark Wrathall.

Later in the decade, Clinton Tolley accepted a position at UCSD in 2007, and in 2011 began organizing the CPC meetings. Tolley had also studied phenomenology at Chicago with Haugeland, Pippin, Arnold Davidson, and the French philosopher, Jocelyn Benoist, recently director of the Husserl Archives in Paris (see, for example, Tolley, 2010). Tolley's interests in the development of phenomenology out of earlier history of German philosophy (Tolley 2012a, 2012b, 2014)[25] led him to help found the annual Seminar in Phenomenology and the History of Philosophy (SIPHOP), whose second meeting was held at UCSD in 2013.

Willard's USC students Walter Hopp and David Kasmier were regular participants in the 2000s. Both worked within Willard's Aristotelian approach to Husserl, and have gone on to

[24] A list of talks and abstracts is available here: http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/ctolley/cpc/abstracts.html.

[25] Compare (Tolley, forthcoming) for a treatment of Brentano and the early Husserl's views on truth as developing in key ways out of the context of Kant and Bolzano's analyses; and see (Tolley, 2017) for an exploration of the continuity of Husserl's later developments with post-Kantian developments in German Idealism.

make important contributions to epistemology and Husserl scholarship (Hopp, 2011; Kasmier 2010). Martin's student Ryan Hickerson at UCSD (now at Western Oregon University), working on, among other things, early theories of mental content (Hickerson 2007, 2008) also began to participate in this period.[26]

Michael Shim was hired at CSU Los Angeles in the 2000s and began to participate. Shim is in some sense an "East Coast" phenomenologist: he received his Ph.D. at SUNY Stony Brook under Donn Welton, with further advising by Manfred Baum, both of whom studied under Husserl's assistant Ludwig Landgrebe. However there was never any sense of division, and his participation and work (much of it at the intersection of philosophy of mind and phenomenology; e.g. Shim 2005; 2011) further eroded any concept of West-Coast vs. East Coast phenomenology. David Pitt, a former student of Jerrold Katz (in a lineage that includes Putnam, Chomsky, and Benacerraf), also joined CSU Los Angeles in the early 2000s. He had been working on the phenomenology of thought at that time (cf. Pitt 2004; "The Phenomenology of Cognition, or What is it like to think P"), and gave a CPC presentation on the topic.

In recent decades, UC Santa Cruz has appointed several philosophers working in the intersection of phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and philosophy of mind. Abe Stone joined the department in 2005 and has done careful historical work on the influences of Husserl on the early Carnap, concerning the philosophy of space (Stone, 2006, 2010, 2014). More recently, Samantha Matherne (Riverside Ph.D. 2013 with Keller, Siewert, and Wrathall) was appointed in 2014, working on how Merleau-Ponty's accounts of perception, aesthetics, and understanding were shaped by neo-Kantians such as Cassirer (Matherne 2012, forthcoming).

The California Circle is also associated with several, in effect, satellite groups from neighboring states, including Paul Livingston and Iain Thomson at New Mexico, who have been organizing a Southwest Seminar in Continental Philosophy. Livingston's dissertation was advised by Smith at Irvine (Ph.D. 2002), and he has gone on to do wide-ranging work on Husserl, Heidegger, history of analytic philosophy, and more recent French philosophy (Livingston 2002, 2003, 2012). Thomson studied with Dreyfus as an undergraduate, did some graduate work at Irvine in the 1990s (e.g. attending Smith's seminar on the *Investigations*, which was also attended by Livingston, Martin, and Yoshimi), and got his Ph.D. at UCSD (Ph.D., 1999), with Martin as chair and Dreyfus as a co-chair. He has gone on to do work on Heidegger, art, education, and later-Heidegger's concept of onto-theology (Thomson, 2005, 2011). Other

[26] In an email to Yoshimi he recalls: "My Ph.D. was awarded by UCSD in 2003 for my dissertation: 'The Breakthrough to Phenomenology: Three Theories of Mental Content in the Brentano School.' My doctoral advisor was Wayne Martin. So I suppose that puts me in 'intellectual lineage', through Wayne, to various people at Berkeley (where he got his degree), but also through *you* given those several years we worked out of the *Inquiry Office* together at UCSD [Hickerson and Yoshimi shared office space with the journal *Inquiry* when Martin was editor]! Another Berkeley influence on me was Iain Thomson, who was several years ahead of me in the program at UCSD. While at UCSD I took lots of seminars from Wayne and from Fred Olafson. I spent a significant amount of time up in Irvine attending events that included David Smith. As you might recall, we took many trips up I-5 to Irvine in the early '00s to attend various meetings of the CPC and its affiliated groups. My active membership in that group, as a graduate student, really stretched from about 2000-2005 (when I took the job up here in Oregon.)"

affiliated work has also occurred, e.g. the now annual meetings of the Workshop in Phenomenological Philosophy, run by Crowell, Drummond, and Hopkins, whose meetings have included many of the philosophers mentioned above.[27]

4. Summary and Conclusion

California phenomenology, in the sense sketched above, originated in gatherings in Harvard and New York, and then took root in the Bay Area. Early publications focused largely on semantics and philosophy of language. Later some of these philosophers moved to Southern California, and became associated with other like-minded philosophers and philosophy departments in the state. In the 1990s regular meetings started being held in Southern California, and at the Pacific APA, on topics broadly distributed across the many categories of contemporary philosophical research. Discussion topics have reflected the diverse interests and backgrounds of participants in these groups.[28]

These talks and meetings developed in a complex way over the past half century, and have helped put phenomenology in contact with almost every area of contemporary philosophy (and other disciplines). Despite this diversity, there have been some general tendencies associated with these groups; to paraphrase Husserl, certain invariant structures have persisted through its variations. Talks often focus on the broader intellectual horizons of phenomenology,

[27] There is, of course, other work on phenomenological philosophy and Continental philosophy in California, including (to take just one example), the long-running colloquium series at CSU Stanislaus.

[28] Topics have included philosophy of art (Casebier 1991; Thomasson, 1996, 2005), art history and criticism (Martin, 2011); mind (Smith and Thomasson 2005; Thomasson 2005; Shim, 2011; Kidd 2011; Livingston 2005, 2013; Walsh and Yoshimi, forthcoming); philosophy of perception (Shim, 2005); cognitive phenomenology (Pitt 2004; Siewert 2011; Bayne and Montague, 2011); philosophy of logic (Tieszen, 1992, 2005; Martin 2005, 2006); collective intentionality, empathy, and social and cultural objects (Mathiesen, 2005; McIntyre 2012; Walsh 2014); epistemology (Kasmier 2003; Hopp, 2007, 2008), psychology and cognitive science (McIntyre 1986, Ford and Smith, 2006; Ford 2008, Yoshimi, 2011, 2012), psychiatry (Martin and Hickerson, 2011); psychoanalysis (Stolorow, 2015), and historical-comparative studies of Rosseau (Westmoreland, 2010), Kant (Hopkins, 2013), German Idealism (Tolley 2017), Bolzano (Tolley 2012a, 2012b), Brentano (Thomasson, 2000; Hickerson, 2007), Twardowski (Hickerson, 2008), Derrida (Schwab, 1986), and Schlick (Livingston, 2002). Phenomenologists and continental philosophers besides Husserl have also been discussed at length, including Heidegger (Livingston 2003; Yoshimi, 2009; Hickerson 2009; Thomson 2011; Wrathall 2010), Merleau-Ponty (Siewert, 2005; Schear 2013), and Deleuze (Schwab, 2000). Many of the publications just cited originate with CPC or SPAP events. A recent issue of *Grazer Philosophische Studien* — Volume 94, No. 3, 2017, "Special Issue: Themes from David Woodruff Smith" — includes articles arising from discussions in California phenomenology: (Livingston, 2017) on presentation and possible-worlds ontology; (Yoshimi, 2017) on the phenomenology of problem-solving; (Walsh, 2017) on motivation; (Thomasson, 2017) on essence, and (Tolley, 2017) on categories and German idealism. Other articles in the volume pursue closely related themes: (Fiocco, 2017) on acquaintance and Brentano; (Montague, 2017) on awareness-of-awareness and Brentano; and (Simons, 2017) on computer pointers and intentionality.

e.g. its relation to analytic philosophy, or to the history of philosophy. Efforts are usually made at meetings to allow for long periods of open discussion. In general, the atmosphere has been as friendly and informal as the phrase "California School" suggests. David Smith notes, "The *modus operandi* for California phenomenology remains informal. Like a 'school' in the European sense. Or like an arts movement, e.g. Impressionism. We keep it informal so we can get things done."[29]

References

Bayne, Tim, and Michelle Montague. 2011. *Cognitive phenomenology*. Oxford University Press.

Beyer, Christian. 1997. Hussearle's Representationalism and the "hypothesis of the Background." *Synthese* 112: 323–352.

Beyer, Christian. 1998. Russell's Principle Considered from Both a Neo-Fregean and a Husserlian Viewpoint.

Beyer, Christian. 2000. Intentionalität und Referenz. Eine sprachanalytische Studie zu Husserls transzendentaler Phänomenologie.

Beyer, Christian. 2001. A neo-Husserlian theory of speaker's reference. *Erkenntnis* 54: 277–297.

Beyer, Christian. 2013. *Von Bolzano zu Husserl: eine Untersuchung über den Ursprung der phänomenologischen Bedeutungslehre*. Vol. 139. Springer-Verlag.

Beyer, Christian. 2015. Edmund Husserl. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2015.

Casebier, Allan. 1991. *Film and phenomenology: Toward a realist theory of cinematic representation*. Cambridge University Press.

Crowell, Steven. 2006. Phenomenological immanence, normativity, and semantic externalism. *Synthese* 160: 335–354. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9083-3.

Daniel, Mano. 1992. A Bibliography of the Noema. In *The Phenomenology of the Noema*, ed. John J. Drummond and Lester Embree, 227–248. Contributions to Phenomenology 10. Springer Netherlands.

Dreyfus, Hubert. 1982. Husserl's perceptual noema. *Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science*: 97–123.

Dreyfus, Hubert. 1991. *Being-in-the-World*. MIT Press.

Dreyfus, Hubert. 1992. *What computers still can't do: a critique of artificial reason*. MIT press.

[29] The data for this paper are based on first-person recollections by the authors, and via email correspondence with past participants. The longest exchanges were with Dagfinn Føllesdal, Ron McIntyre, Allan Casebier, Richard Tieszen, Wayne Martin, and Robert Tragesser. Saraching Chao provided helpful editorial support. We would also like to note the recent passing of Dallas Willard (2013), Jaakko Hintikka (2015), Bert Dreyfus (2017), and Rick Tieszen (2017), to whom this article is dedicated.

Dreyfus, Hubert. 1999. The Primacy of Phenomenology over Logical Analysis. *Philosophical Topics* 27: 3–24.

Dreyfus, Hubert, and Harrison Hall. 1982. *Husserl intentionality and cognitive science*. MIT Press.

Dreyfus, Hubert, and Mark Wrathall. 2008. *A companion to Heidegger*. John Wiley & Sons.

Drummond, John J. 1984. Review of: Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. *Husserl Studies* 1: 201–225. doi:10.1007/BF01569215.

Drummond, John J. 1985. Frege and Husserl: Another look at the issue of influence. *Husserl Studies* 2: 245–265. doi:10.1007/BF00430969.

Drummond, John J. 1990. *Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism: Noema and object*. 4. Springer.

Farber, Marvin. 1943. *The foundation of phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the quest for a rigorous science of philosophy*. Vol. 9. Transaction Publishers.

Fiocco, M. Oreste. 2017. Knowing Things in Themselves: Mind, Brentano and Acquaintance. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 94: 332-358.

Fisette, D. 1993. Les suites de la phénoménologie. *Philosophiques* 20: 247–265.

Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1958. Husserl Und Frege Ein Beitrag Zur Beleuchtung der Entstehung der Phänomenologischen Philosophie.

Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1969. Husserl's Notion of Noema. *The Journal of Philosophy* 66: 680–687. doi:10.2307/2024451.

Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1982. Husserl's theory of perception. In *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Hall, Harrison, 93–96. MIT Press.

Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1994. *Husserl and Frege: A contribution to elucidating the origins of phenomenological philosophy*. Springer.

Ford, Jason. 2008. Attention and the New Sceptics. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 15: 59–86.

Ford, Jason, and David Woodruff Smith. 2006. Consciousness, Self, and Attention. In *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, ed. Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, 353–377. MIT Press.

Gurwitsch, Aron. 1964. *Field of consciousness*. 2. Duquesne University Press.

Harvey, Charles W. 1986. Husserl's phenomenology and possible worlds semantics: A reexamination. *Husserl Studies* 3: 191–207. doi:10.1007/BF00211004.

Hickerson, Ryan. 2007. The history of intentionality: Theories of consciousness from Brentano to Husserl.

Hickerson, Ryan. 2008. Twardowski And Representationalism. *Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* 4. doi:10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.127.

Hickerson, Ryan. 2009. Neglecting the Question of Being: Heidegger's Argument Against Husserl. *Inquiry* 52: 574–595. doi:10.1080/00201740903377842.

Hopkins, Burt C. 2013. Manifold, Intuition, and Synthesis in Kant and Husserl. *Logical Analysis & History of Philosophy/Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse* 16.

Hopp, Walter. 2007. *Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account*. Cambridge University Press.

Hopp, Walter. 2008. Husserl, phenomenology, and foundationalism. *Inquiry* 51: 194–216.

Husserl, Edmund. 1994. Early writings in the philosophy of logic and mathematics.

Husserl, Edmund. 2012. *Philosophy of arithmetic: Psychological and logical investigations with supplementary texts from 1887–1901*. Vol. 10. Springer Science & Business Media.

Ingarden, Roman, and Arthur Szylewicz. 2013. *Controversy over the Existence of the World: Volume I*. 1 edition. Frankfurt am Main ; New York: Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.

Kasmier, David. 2003. Husserl's Theory of A Priori Knowledge: A Response to the Failure of Contemporary Rationalism. University of Southern California.

Kasmier, David. 2010. A defense of Husserl's method of free variation.

Keller, Pierre. 1999. *Husserl and Heidegger on human experience*. Cambridge University Press.

Kersey, Ethel. 1983. The Noema, Husserlian and Beyond: An Annotated Bibliography of English Language Sources. *Philosophy Research Archives* 9.

Kidd, Chad. 2011. Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation. *Philosophical studies* 152: 361–383.

Langsdorf, L. 1985. Review of H. Dreyfus (ed.), Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. *Husserl Studies* 2: 303–311. doi:10.1007/BF00430969.

Livingston, Paul. 2002. Husserl and Schlick on the Logical Form of Experience. *Synthese* 132: 239–272. doi:10.1023/A:1020378731241.

Livingston, Paul. 2003. Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and Lived-Experience. *Inquiry* 46: 324–345.

Livingston, Paul. 2005. Functionalism and Logical Analysis. In *Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind*, ed. David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson, 19. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Livingston, Paul. 2012. *The Politics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein, and the Consequences of Formalism*. Vol. 27. Routledge.

Livingston, Paul. 2013. Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 20: 71–92.

Livingston, Paul. 2017. Presentation and the Ontology of Consciousness. *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 94: 301-331.

Martin, Wayne. 1997. *Idealism and objectivity: understanding Fichte's Jena project*. Cambridge Univ Press.

Martin, Wayne. 1999. Husserl's Relapse? Concerning a Fregean Challenge to Phenomenology. *Inquiry* 42: 343–369. doi:10.1080/002017499321444.

Martin, Wayne. 2005. Husserl and the Logic of Consciousness. In *Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind*, ed. David Woodruff Smith and Amie Lynn Thomasson, 203. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Martin, Wayne. 2006. *Theories of judgment: Psychology, logic, phenomenology*. Cambridge University Press.

Martin, Wayne. 2007. Review of David Woodruff Smith, Husserl. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2007.

Martin, Wayne. The Judgment of Adam. In *Art and Phenomenology*, ed. Joseph Perry. Routledge.

Martin, Wayne, and Ryan Hickerson. 2011. Mental capacity and the applied phenomenology of judgement. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 12: 195–214. doi:10.1007/s11097-011-9242-y.

Matherne, Samantha. Forthcoming. Kantian Themes in Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Perception. *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*.

Matherne, Samantha. 2012. The Inclusive Interpretation of Kant's Aesthetic Ideas. *The British Journal of Aesthetics*.

Mathiesen, Kay. 2005. Collective consciousness. *Phenomenology and philosophy of mind*: 235.

McIntyre, Ronald. 1982. Intending and referring. In *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*. Cambridge MA., MIT Press.

McIntyre, Ronald. 1984. Searle on Intentionality. *Inquiry* 27: 468–483.

McIntyre, Ronald. 1986. Husserl and the representational theory of mind. *Topoi* 5: 101–113.

McIntyre, Ronald. 1987. Husserl and Frege. *Journal of Philosophy* 84: 528–535.

McIntyre, Ronald. 2012. "We-Subjectivity": Husserl on Community and Communal Constitution. *Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl: A Collection of Essays* 8: 61.

McIntyre, Ronald, and David Woodruff Smith. 1989. Theory of intentionality. *Husserl's phenomenology: A textbook*: 147–79.

McKenna, William. 1985. Review of I. Miller, Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness. *Husserl Studies* 2: 291–299. doi:10.1007/BF00430969.

Miller, Izchak. 1984. *Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness*. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.

Montague, Michelle. 2017. What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness? *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 94: 359-380.

Olafson, Frederick A. 1967. Principles and persons.

Olafson, Frederick A. 1991. Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind.

Olafson, Frederick A. 1994. Heidegger à la Wittgenstein or "coping"with Professor Dreyfus. *Inquiry* 37: 45–64.

Olafson, Frederick A. 1995. *What is a human being?: a Heideggerian view*. Cambridge University Press.

Pitt, David. 2004. The Phenomenology of Cognition Or What Is It Like to Think That P? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 69: 1–36. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x.

Schear, Joseph. fortchoming. *Horizons of Intentionality: From Husserl to Heidegger*. Oxford University Press.

Schear, Joseph. 2013. *Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate*. Routledge.

Schwab, Martin. 1986. The rejection of origin: Derrida's interpretation of Husserl. *Topoi* 5: 163–175.

Schwab, Martin. 2000. Escape from the image: Deleuze's image-ontology.

Searle, John. 2005. The phenomenological illusion.

Shim, Michael K. 2005. The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl's phenomenology of perception. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 4: 209–229.

Shim, Michael K. 2011. Representationalism and Husserlian phenomenology. *Husserl studies* 27: 197–215.

Siewert, Charles. 1998. *The significance of consciousness*. Princeton University Press.

Siewert, Charles. 2005. Attention and sensorimotor intentionality. *Phenomenology and philosophy of mind*: 270.

Siewert, Charles. 2011. Phenomenal thought. *Cognitive phenomenology*: 236–267.

Silverman, Hugh J. 1980. Phenomenology. *Social Research* 47: 704–720.

Simons, Peter. 2017. Pointers: The Missing Link between Intentionalty and Reference. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 94: 381-390.

Smith, Barry, and David Woodruff Smith. 1995. *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*. Cambridge University Press.

Smith, David Woodruff. 1981. Indexical sense and reference. *Synthese* 49: 101–127. doi:10.1007/BF01063916.

Smith, David Woodruff. 1983. Husserl's philosophy of mind. In *Philosophy of Mind/Philosophie de l'esprit*, ed. Guttorm Fløistad, 249–286. Contemporary philosophy/La Philosophie Contemporaine 4. Springer Netherlands.

Smith, David Woodruff. 1989. *The circle of acquaintance*. Vol. 205. Springer Science & Business Media.

Smith, David Woodruff. 2013. *Husserl*. 2 edition. London ; New York: Routledge.

Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald McIntyre. 1971. Intentionality Via Intensions. *Journal of Philosophy* 68: 541–560.

Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald McIntyre. 1982. *Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language*. Springer.

Smith, David Woodruff, and Amie Lynn Thomasson. 2005. *Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1973. Husserl's way into phenomenology for Americans: A letter and its sequel. In *Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism*, 168–191. Springer.

Stolorow, Robert. 2015. *World, Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis*. Routledge.

Stone, Abraham. 2006. Heidegger and Carnap on the Overcoming of Metaphysics. *Martin Heidegger*: 217–244.

Stone, Abraham. 2010. On the sources and implications of Carnap's Der Raum. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 41: 65–74.

Stone, Abraham. 2014. Husserl, Heidegger and Carnap on Fixing the Sense of Philosophical Terminology.

Thomasson, Amie L. 1996. Fiction and Intentionality. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 56: 277–298.

Thomasson, Amie L. 1999. *Fiction and metaphysics*. Cambridge University Press.

Thomasson, Amie L. 2002. Phenomenology and the Development of Analytic Philosophy. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 40: 115–142. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2002.tb01926.x.

Thomasson, Amie L. 2003. Introspection and phenomenological method. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 2: 239–254. doi:10.1023/B:PHEN.0000004927.79475.46.

Thomasson, Amie L. 2005. First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology. In *Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind*, ed. David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson, 115–138. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Thomasson, Amie L. Husserl on Essences: A Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 94: 436-459.

Thomson, Iain. 2005. *Heidegger on ontotheology: Technology and the politics of education*. Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, Iain. 2011. *Heidegger, art, and postmodernity*. Cambridge University Press.

Tieszen, Richard. 1989. Review of H. R. Otto and J. A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. *Husserl Studies* 6: 176–186. doi:10.1007/BF00430969.

Tieszen, Richard. 1992. Kurt Godel and phenomenology. *Philosophy of Science*: 176–194.

Tieszen, Richard. 2005. *Phenomenology, logic, and the philosophy of mathematics*. Vol. 203. Cambridge University Press.

Tieszen, Richard. 2011. *After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic*. Oxford University Press.

Todes, Samuel. 2001. *Body and world*. MIT Press.

Tolley, Clinton. forthcoming. Idealism and the Question of Truth. In *Oxford Handbook on Truth.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tolley, Clinton. 2010. Entre sens et non-sens: Benoist sur l'explication réaliste de l'intentionalité. *Philosophiques* 37: 491–498.

Tolley, Clinton. 2012a. Bolzano and Kant on the Nature of Logic. *History and Philosophy of Logic* 33: 307–327.

Tolley, Clinton. 2012b. Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 85: 63–88.

Tolley, Clinton. 2014. Bolzano and Kant on Space and Outer Intuition. *The New Anti-Kant*: 157.

Tolley, Clinton. 2017. Husserl's Philosophy of the Categories and His Development toward Absolute Idealism. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 94: 460-493.

Tragesser, Robert S. 1977. Phenomenology and logic.

Tragesser, Robert S. 1984. *Husserl and realism in logic and mathematics*. CUP Archive.

Ueberweg, Friedrich, Karl Praechter, Max Frischeisen-Köhler, and Traugott Konstantin Oesterreich. 1927. *Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*. E.S. Mittler.

Walsh, Philip. 2014. Empathy, Embodiment, and the Unity of Expression. *Topoi* 33: 215–226.

Walsh, Philip. 2017. Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 94: 410-435.

Walsh, Phillip, and Jeff Yoshimi. forthcoming. Philosophy of mind in the phenomenological tradition. In *History of Philosophy of Mind in the 20th Century*.

Welton, Donn. 1983. *The Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology*. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Kluwer Boston.

Welton, Donn. 2000. *The Other Husserl: The horizons of transcendental phenomenology*. Indiana University Press.

Westmoreland, Peter. 2010. Rousseau's Phenomenological Model for the Co-Constitution of Self and World. In *Phenomenology 2010: Selected essays from North America, phenomenology within philosophy*, ed. Michael Barber and Thomas J. Nenon. Zeta Books.

Willard, Dallas. 1986. Logic and the objectivity of knowledge: A study of Husserl's early philosophy.

Willard, Dallas. 1988. RS Tragesser," Husserl and realism in logic and mathematics."

Wrathall, Mark A. 2010. *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History*. Cambridge University Press.

Yoshimi, Jeff. 2009. Husserl's Theory of Belief and the Heideggerean Critique. *Husserl studies* 25: 121–140.

Yoshimi, Jeff. 2011. Phenomenology and Connectionism. *Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology* 2: 1–12. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00288.

Yoshimi, Jeff. 2012. Two dynamical themes in Husserl. In *Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience*, Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, and Neta Zach, 88:165–184.

Yoshimi, Jeff. 2017. The Phenomenology of Problem Solving. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 94: 391-409.

Yoshimi, Jeff, and David W. Vinson. 2015. Extending Gurwitsch's field theory of consciousness. *Consciousness and Cognition* 34: 104–123. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.03.017.