Phenomenological psychology as philosophy of mind*

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Abstract: I review Husserl's writings on psychology and in particular phenomenological psychology, a kind of a priori study of the mind and consciousness. I argue that phenomenological psychology can be regarded as a form of philosophy of mind, insofar as both involve conceptual analyses of conscious processes, which can be pursued alongside empirical studies of brain and behavior. Husserl also says that every claim of phenomenological psychology can be translated into transcendental phenomenology, and vice-versa. The two areas are "precisely parallel." Thus, the most obscure depths of transcendental phenomenology can, if my reading is correct, be re-framed as conceptual analyses in the philosophy of mind. Phenomenological or "pure" psychology is the kinder, gentler, cousin to transcendental phenomenology.

Introduction

Transcendental phenomenology is deep and heady. It studies a priori conditions of the possibility of an appearing world, for example, rules which describe how streams of visual, bodily, and other forms of experience must unfold in a coordinated way in order for physical objects to appear. Phenomenological psychology is more down to earth. Begin with empirical psychology and generalize its results. Consider not just actual, but possible mental states, and identify invariant conceptual structures characterizing those states.[1] Husserl argues that the two areas are parallel to each other: any claim of phenomenological psychology can be transformed into a claim of transcendental phenomenology, and vice versa.

I will argue that phenomenological psychology, for its part, can be regarded as a form of philosophy of mind (construed broadly to include philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of perception, and metaphysics of mind). Both broad areas study mental states using conceptual analyses whose scope goes beyond what our best scientific theories tell us. Both areas pursue these conceptual analyses alongside empirical research.

These considerations suggest that some contemporary philosophers of mind are, whether they realize it or not, phenomenological psychologists. Moreover, their claims are relevant to transcendental phenomenology insofar as they can be translated into claims about the necessary structure of objects as given in conscious experience.

In the first section of this chapter, I review Husserl's background in psychology and give a broad overview of his attitude towards psychology as it developed over the course of his career. In the second section I consider Husserl's lectures on phenomenological psychology and related writings from his later period, where he formulates his concept of pure psychology in detail, and

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1 Throughout this chapter I will move between reference to conceptual analysis and eidetic analysis without distinguishing the two, though for Husserl concepts are specifically associated with linguistic acts (Sowa 2011). Thus, for example, we can distinguish the linguistic meaning of a phrase like "equilateral triangle" (a concept) from what our thinking is directed at when we think about equilateral triangles (an essence).

develops its "parallel" relationship with transcendental philosophy. In the third section I describe Husserl's subtle view of the relationship between pure and empirical psychology. He encourages phenomenological psychology to inform empirical psychology and even sees revolutionary potential in this direction of influence. He also allows phenomenological psychology to be influenced by empirical psychology, so long as any resulting claims are subsequently checked against phenomenological intuition. In the final section I argue that phenomenological psychology (and transcendental phenomenology) can be subsumed within philosophy of mind, broadly construed.

Historical background

Husserl studied psychology with some of the major figures of nineteenth-century psychology, including Wundt, Brentano, and Stumpf, and his writings demonstrate broad familiarity with nineteenth-century psychology and psychophysics.

As a teenaged university student at Leipzig (1876–1878), Husserl attended the lectures of Wilhelm Wundt, who is generally considered to be the founder of experimental psychology, and who is notable for the sheer breadth of his thought and writing (Husserl praised him for his "organizing power" [Husserl 1977, 2]). Wundt wrote book length studies—some multi-volumed—on physiology, sensation, physiological psychology, psychology, logic, ethics, philosophy, and anthropological psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*), among other topics. Wundt defined the "task" of psychology as involving two problems: "(1) What are the elements of consciousness? (2) What combinations do these elements undergo and what laws govern these combinations?" (Wundt 1924, 44). The laws he identifies describe how sensations are fused or synthesized (*Verschmelzung*) into perceptions via networks of passive associations, and how these perceptions can then be actively "apperceived" by attention and related to one another. He describes these (and other) laws in quantitative terms, and bases them on an astonishing wealth of experimental work, much of it anticipating later work, e.g., in cognitive psychology (Blumenthal 1977). Husserl critiqued Wundt's account of logic in his Prolegomena, though in many ways Husserl's phenomenology is close to Wundt's, for example his analysis of sensory data and their "passive and active syntheses."

Husserl subsequently studied at Berlin, then at Vienna, where he met Franz Brentano. Though less experimentally oriented than Wundt, Brentano was supportive of early experimental research. His descriptive or pure psychology had similar broad aims to Wundt's psychology: "to determine the elements of human consciousness and the ways in which they are connected" (Brentano 2012, 13). Brentano distinguished these pure psychological inquiries from physiological or "genetic" studies of the "causes that give rise to human consciousness" (ibid., 4). Whereas genetic psychology studies the physical factors that give rise to conscious states, descriptive psychology studies the forms and laws of combinations of these contents. His account of the elements of consciousness focused, famously, on intentional acts directed at objects, e.g., presentations, judgments, and directed emotions such as love and hate, as well as compounds of these. Kriegel gives the example of Brentano's account of delight: "delight at x involves (i) a contemplation of x plus (ii) an enjoyment of the contemplation of x" (Kriegel 2018).

Another early psychological influence on Husserl was Carl Stumpf, a former student of Brentano's and Husserl's Habilitation advisor at Halle, who Husserl would ultimately dedicate the *Logical Investigations* to. Stump refined Brentano's classificatory system and was more

active as an experimental psychologist (his "lab" included a cathedral organ and tuning-fork piano (Stumpf 1930)). He developed a fairly sophisticated mereological account of the components of acoustical phenomena, e.g., intensity, timbre, pitch, etc. Husserl's theory of parts and wholes owes much to Stumpf, and the two were personally close (Fisette 2009).
Husserl's professional career can be divided into three phases, corresponding to his time at Halle as Privatdozent (1886–1901), his time at Göttingen as a Professor (1901–1916), and his time at Freiburg (1916–1938), first as Professor, then as a retired Professor Ordinarius. In each of these phases Husserl devoted considerable attention to psychology and its relation to philosophy and phenomenology.

In the first period, at Halle, Husserl is focused on mistakes associated with psychology, in particular the mistake of conflating the laws of logical thinking with the logical content of the laws themselves (e.g., taking modus ponens to be a contingent rule of human thinking rather than a universally valid law). This problem is clearly evident in Mill and Wundt's work, for example, and seems to have been fairly common at the time. In fact, Husserl's own early analysis of number had been critiqued by Frege for being psychologistic, and perhaps in part because of this Husserl went to great lengths in subsequent works to clarify that he was not a psychologistic philosopher.[2] He wrote a book-length critique of psychologism as the Prolegomena to the *Logical Investigations*, and developed related critiques of skepticism, naturalism, and empiricism in the 1890s and 1900s. All three critiques target what Moran (2008) calls a "performative self-contradiction." Skepticism, for example, claims that objectively valid knowledge is impossible. But that claim is itself presented as objectively valid knowledge (Husserl 2008, 178). Empiricism is a "counter-sense" because it asserts that "all valid thinking is based upon experience," which is a general claim that could not be justified by empirical experiences of particular cases (Husserl, 1982, §20; also see Husserl, 1976, §32).[3]

In Husserl's second period, at Göttingen, he writes the *Ideas* trilogy and develops his program of transcendental-eidetic phenomenology. According to Husserl, any object, of any type, can be understood as an achievement of coordinated conscious processes. He develops separate "regional ontologies" for different types of object, describing the rules and patterns which allow these different types of object to appear. This ontological system is intended to serve as an a priori basis for all the sciences, including psychology. Husserl discusses the grounding of psychology at length throughout the three books of Ideas. In the first (and only published) volume he repeats his earlier arguments against naturalism and empiricism, which led to misunderstandings of his position, as we will see. In the second volume he describes the region of physical reality and its relation to the region of animate reality, which includes mental states, and also describes dependencies between them: e.g., that brushing an object against one's arms produces an ordered sequence of localized sensations (Yoshimi 2010). In the third volume he shows how this regional ontology can be used to provide an a priori basis for psychology.[4]
In his period at Freiburg, and into his retirement, Husserl primarily produced unpublished manuscripts and lectures. He was anxious to gather these materials together and to present his philosophical program in a final systematic work. He began to treat pure psychology as an

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2 Whether Frege's critique influenced Husserl in this way is controversial (Mohanty 1982), but the review was clearly associated with some kind of change. As McIntyre notes, "However the review may have influenced Husserl's actual views, his subsequent writings are much more sensitive to the issues Frege raised" (1987, 530).
3 Husserl argues that naturalism refutes itself in a similar way (Husserl 2002).
4 The actual contents of the three books (the first published, the second unpublished but heavily edited, the third largely unedited after initial drafting), does not quite match the three-book structure Husserl imagined (see Husserl 1982, xxi–xxii).

accessible route into his difficult philosophical program, a way of starting in the familiar territory of empirical psychology but ultimately landing in transcendental phenomenology. He develops this "pedagogical idea" in several writings, including his lecture course on *Phenomenological Psychology*, which will be our focus, and in other late works aimed at disseminating his ideas to a wider audience. These include the *Encyclopedia* article and its various drafts (including the initial draft material from Heidegger), the *Amsterdam Lectures*, the *Paris Lectures*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

Phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology

Husserl's lectures on *Phenomenological Psychology* were given in the summer semester of 1925 at Freiburg. The lectures open with a review of the history of psychology, tracing it to Plato and Aristotle, and noting that it "never lacked diligent cultivation" (Husserl 1997, 2).[5] After the seventeenth century it endeavored to model itself on the new science of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. He notes that psychology could never "compete in fruitfulness and rigor with the pace-setting natural sciences" (120), though he lauds nineteenth-century advances in "the psychophysics of the senses," the "highly developed experimental skill of physiology" (2), and the emergence of professional organizations and methodologies.

Husserl then develops an early version of his historical critique of natural sciences (which he would later elaborate in *Crisis*), according to which the natural sciences are wrong to treat objective data as fundamental, since those data are themselves derivative on a more fundamental lifeworld of experience. He draws on Dilthey, who argued that the full richness of a person's "life stream" could not be captured by psychophysical laws linking stimuli with simple forms of experience. Dilthey emphasizes the interweaving of experiential elements in an "all-inclusive nexus" that "streams on continually" (5). Husserl's examples include projecting oneself into the "living and striving of [an] artist" (7), and historically reconstructing the personality and motives of Bismark (13). However, though he appreciates Dilthey's rich holistic approach, he faults it for lacking a "sufficiently fundamental sharpness" (7). Dilthey is "much more a man of brilliant intuitions of the whole than of analyses and abstract theorizings" (3). Thus, Dilthey's method could never "get beyond vague empirical generalizations" and "a mere natural history of historical forms of mind." What is missing in Dilthey is detailed conceptual analysis, or in Husserl's terms, the eidetic method. Dilthey "has not yet seen that there is such a thing as a generic essential description on the basis of [...] an intuition of essence" (8–9), which could serve as "an explanatory result [that] socio-cultural scientific work could be referred back to methodically" (12).

Husserl next considers Brentano, who complements Dilthey's rich holism with a more systematic intentional theory, an account of the "multiple forms of consciousness as consciousness of something, with all its constituents" (23). He also refers to Brentano's descriptive psychology (which Brentano himself described as "pure psychology"), which studies the parts and wholes of experiences independently of their causal or physiological origins. Thus Brentano adds a layer of classificatory rigor to Dilthey's "life stream" analyses of the whole person. However, Husserl also finds Brentano lacking. While he achieved a useful classification of intentional experiences and their objects, he did not develop a dynamical analysis of how these objects are "formed" in flowing streams of consciousness (29). He did not understand intentional objects as "a performance accomplished in multiple demonstrable forms and pertinent

5 All quotes following without citation information are to (Husserl 1977).

syntheses" (26). He "never saw and took up the great task of [...] inquiring about the entire multiplicity of possible modes of consciousness by which such objectivities come to consciousness for us" (26). Transcendental philosophy was thus "foreign to him" as was "the true meaning of transcendental philosophy, indeed the necessity of a basic eidetic transcendental discipline related to transcendental subjectivity" (122). Husserl goes on to describe Logical Investigations as "the full development of Brentano's suggestions" (24), an "actually methodologically matured execution of the psychology he had in mind" (24).

On the basis of his discussion of Dilthey and Brentano, Husserl finally turns to pure psychology, which he describes as the "beginning of a novel psychology," a revival of "the old idea of an a priori psychology" (29).[6] Pure psychology and empirical psychology both study consciousness, but in different ways. In empirical psychology conscious experiences are treated as actual states of an organism, as psychical experiences located in space and time. They are "real occurrences which […] find their place with the real subjects to whom they belong in the one spatiotemporal world" (Husserl 1982). They are observed using measurement devices: "they have their objective place in time and objective temporal duration, which can at any given time be objectively determined by chronometers and other tools of measurement" (Husserl 2008, 198).

In pure psychology, by contrast, these same data are regarded as phenomena, e.g., not this actual perception of a chair, but this perception as a possible perception, taken only as a member of the class of possible perceptions of physical things. Whereas actual perceptions must be studied using experiments and observations, possible perceptions can be studied using the eidetic method, i.e., a type of conceptual analysis. Thus we have two parallel forms of data:

> In the one case we have data belonging to the world […] data taken as psychic components. In the other case the parallel data, with their like contents, are not taken in this manner, because the whole world, when one is in the phenomenological attitude, is not accepted as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon. Husserl 1960, 32

So pure or phenomenological psychology involves a new way of analyzing the same data as empirical psychology, where the actually given posits of everyday life are converted into pure data of consciousness, which are instances of various phenomenological types, and which can be studied using Husserl's eidetic method.[7]

Husserl goes on to argue that phenomenological psychology is itself just transcendental phenomenology in another guise, a "precise parallel to transcendental phenomenology of consciousness" (Husserl 1960, 32).[8] Transcendental philosophy studies the conditions under which stable objects appear in the flow of consciousness. This is an overarching theme for Husserl, and the force animating some of the more rhetorically charged parts of his work: the idea that being itself—in all its categories—can be disclosed by his new science. Pure psychology is parallel to transcendental phenomenology in the sense that any claim of one can be converted into a corresponding claim of the other:

> On the one hand, every […] pure psychology of knowledge (even though it is not itself a transcendental theory) can be "changed over" into a transcendental [theory of

6 In the secondary literature see Kockelmans 1967 and Uhler 1987.
7 A useful discussion of Husserl's understanding of essences and eidetic sciences is (Sowa 2011).
8 For a more critical discussion of this parallel and its implications see (Crowell 2002).

> knowledge]. And on the other hand, every genuine transcendental theory of knowledge […] can be changed over into a pure psychology of knowledge. This holds on both sides, proposition for proposition. Bracketed text is the editor's; Husserl 1997, 120.[9]

How, for example, do light, energy, or legislative bodies manifest themselves? From the transcendental perspective, they manifest themselves as phenomena in streams of experiences, as performances "accomplished in multiple demonstrable forms and pertinent syntheses" (26). From the psychological perspective, these same phenomena can be understood in terms of pure concepts, considered independently of their factual instantiation, e.g., the pure concepts of extension, space, time, social group, etc. that must be understood in order to understand light, energy, and legislative bodies in the first place.

In Husserl's later works of the Freiburg period, this parallel is taken to be pedagogically important, because it suggests that one can learn about transcendental phenomenology by way of pure psychology. Pure psychology is simpler because it starts from the familiar natural attitude, a domain of "positivity," which precedes all philosophical reflection. We then consider these familiar objects of our world from a conceptual, eidetic standpoint. When we do that, we are doing what the transcendental phenomenologist does, inquiring into the rules and conditions that make it possible to perceive objects to begin with. It is as if we are tricked into transcendental phenomenology. He refers to this as a "pedagogical idea about how to introduce people to phenomenology given all the difficulties related to its unaccustomed transcendental attitude" (Husserl 1997, 123). This pedagogical insight explains pure psychology's prominence in Husserl's later works. It was the set up for the *Encyclopedia* article, and played a major role in his *Amsterdam Lectures*, the *Paris Lectures*, and *The Crisis*, all of which were intended to communicate his ideas to a broad international audience.

Phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology

Transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology both study objects in the phenomenological attitude. Both are contrasted with empirical psychology, which studies actually existing entities in the natural attitude. Empirical psychology is an a posteriori, empirical discipline, which considers actual objects and experimentally produced variations on them. Phenomenological psychology is an a priori discipline, which considers possible objects of consciousness, and considers imagined variations on these phenomena. We can, in principle, move between these two forms of study. Going from empirical to phenomenological psychology, we take actual processes and "possibilize" them, freeing them of their ties to the real world.[10] In the reverse direction, we can empirically study phenomenological results, focusing on pure possibilities only insofar as they are actualized in the real world, e.g., performing an experiment to test a proposed eidetic claim.

So inter-disciplinary influence is possible, but how did Husserl think it should go in practice? To what extent and in what way should phenomenological psychology influence

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9 Additional evidence. From phenomenology to psychology: "transcendental phenomenology has this characteristic, that every one of its propositions admits of being transformed into an a priori psychological proposition in the natural sense" (p. 32). From psychology to phenomenology: "Every pure psychological insight … [can be] utilized transcendentally so long as it receives its pure sense through the genuine transcendental reduction" (Husserl 1997, 6:120).

10 See Sowa's discussion of the "equivalence of actualities with pure possibilities" (2011, 258).

empirical psychology, and vice versa? These two directions of influence are treated differently by Husserl.

In the first direction we have phenomenological psychology and its influence on empirical psychology. Husserl is quite enthusiastic about this direction of influence. He says that psychology will be "amplified" and made "made incomparably more fruitful" by way of the influence of phenomenology, so much so that "someday the psychologists will consider the 'instrument' of phenomenological eidetic theory to be no less important, indeed at first probably very much more important, than mechanical instruments" (Husserl 2001, 43). Pure a priori sciences analyze the fundamental concepts at work in some region of reality, e.g., the psychic sphere. For example, if a psychologist studies judgements of temporal intervals in beat sequences, she is, whether she realizes it or not, making use of pure concepts relating to time consciousness and predicative judgment, that can be separately analyzed by phenomenologists.[11] As Heidegger, in his draft of the Encyclopedia article, put it:

> Pure psychology furnishes the necessary a priori foundation for empirical psychology […] psychology requires a disclosure of the a priori typical forms without which it is impossible to think the I (or the we), consciousness, the objects of consciousness, and hence any psychic life at all. Heidegger, as quote din Husserl 1997, 116

Husserl elaborates on the way a pure science can enrich an empirical science using the example of physics. Physics relies on pure concepts of space and time, which are studied in "pure geometry," "pure mechanics," and other areas where eidetic analyses "establish in concepts and laws […] that without which any nature at all would be inconceivable" (31).[12] For example, we can't frame a law about uniform linear motion without prior concepts of position, time, line, velocity, and space. Physics, could, of course, proceed without much reflection on these pure concepts, but:

> empirically inductive natural science mounted an incomparably higher level of knowledge at that moment when it appropriated the mathematics of nature and recognized that the systematic formation of that a priori which belongs inseparably to nature provides ipso facto an infinity of absolutely necessary laws (Husserl, 1997).

He goes on to say "the same must hold for every experiential science," including psychology: they must all rise above "inductive empirical procedure" and establish essential laws.

In the reverse direction, how can empirical psychology influence pure psychology? Here the situation is more complex. Husserl lived at a time when logic and psychology were routinely confused with each other. It was also a time when psychology was trying to emulate the success of natural sciences. He laments that the "younger generation of psychologists" are "crushed by the monstrously swollen experimental-psychological literature," leading them to "an unclear and superficial naturalism" (Husserl 2001, 43). He does allow that philosophy and phenomenology

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11 A more formalized way of thinking about this in terms of alternation vs. variation: psychologists produce actual changes in objects (what Husserl calls "alternations") by experimentally manipulating and observing them. These changes must always occur within the broader constraints imposed by the essences governing pure possibilities. Experimental alternations thus occur within proper subsets of the classes over which eidetic variations range.

12 Or again, "nature as spatial must […] satisfy the essential forms and essential laws of every conceivable space, all conceivable spatial figures" (35).

have something to gain from empirical work. He notes "philosophy obviously has to lean on special sciences for support, to further process their results," but even in making this concession goes on to say "The grain of truth that lies in [statements like this] has not become larger through repetition; on the other hand, the damage caused by the much greater portion of untruth in these distorted statements has become enormous. It threatens to consume German Philosophy" (ibid., 12). In fact, the whole tenor of his early and middle works is critical of an over-reliance on experimental methods and can lead to the mistaken impression that Husserl is totally opposed to empirical psychology.

Husserl recognized this misunderstanding, and on multiple occasions makes an effort to correct it. In his 1930 Author's Preface to the English translation of *Ideas I*, for example, he notes "my criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men" (Husserl 1982, xviii). He intends, rather, "an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level" and emphasizes "the obvious respect to which the new experimental psychology is fully entitled" (ibid., 43).[13] Still, Husserl provides little detail (to my knowledge) about how pure psychology can be influenced by empirical psychology, beyond saying that it "has to lean on special sciences for support." We can piece together a fuller picture of the ways an empirical science can support a pure science by considering some features of Husserl's epistemology, and by elaborating on his physics example.

One of the great achievements of the last few decades of Husserl scholarship has been clarifying Husserl's phenomenological method in terms of contemporary work in epistemology (Drummond 1990; Hopp 2008; Berghofer 2018a). A compelling case has been made that Husserl was a "moderate foundationalist," according to whom intuitions, including eidetic intuitions, are immediately justifying. However, although eidetic intuitions are a source of immediate justification, they are not an infallible source of justification: the beliefs they justify can be revised or defeated. For example, Husserl allows that one eidetic seeing can conflict with another (Berghofer 2018a). An eidetic claim can also be revised on the basis of mathematical reasoning, empirical evidence, or collaborative engagement with other researchers. Husserl explicitly discusses cases like these, but in every case requires that any new or revised claim be confirmed by new intuitions. In the case of inference, for example, Husserl says: "inferences, non-intuitive modes of procedure of any kind, only have the methodological function of leading us to the matters in question upon which a subsequent direct seeing of essences must make given" (Husserl 1982, 169). Similarly, for empirical evidence, which can "call the attention of the investigator" to possible mistakes, and "prompt him to probe these findings in a new intuition" (quoted in Berghofer 2018, 560). So a priori research is subject to multiple forms of correction and revision, including revisions suggested by empirical research, so long as the corrections and revisions are themselves checked against subsequent intuitions.

It is natural to ask what the resulting interactions might look like, in practice. Here I think Husserl's own example of physics in relation to the pure concepts of space and time is instructive. Consider our modern concept of spacetime: a pseudo-Riemannian manifold that is

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13 In his *Lectures on Logic and Theory of Knowledge* from 1906/1907 he presents these misunderstandings in terms of a dialectic. He describes how on the one hand he we was misunderstood by "Neo-Kantians and Neo-Fichteans" who "combat any involvement of psychology in theory of knowledge as psychologism and swear by the transcendental method" and on the other by "psychologistic empiricists" who "have maliciously said […] that the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* is […] psychology slain with a thousand arguments" (Husserl 2008, 197). See also Husserl 1982, §§20 and 21.

locally Minkowskian. A great deal of conceptual structure is packed into this mathematical concept, much of which developed in pure mathematics, independently of empirical research. For example, a Minkowski space (which describes spacetime without the influence of gravity), is one of the $3^4 = 81$ possible 4-dimensional geometries associated with Felix Klein's 1872 *Erlangen Program* (Gromov 1990). However, the focus on this particular geometry and the massive development of theory around it was guided by a great deal of experimental work, for example the observation that the speed of light is invariant in different reference frames.

The picture that emerges is one where pure and empirical sciences are semi-autonomous. They can proceed independently according to their own methods: eidetic analysis of pure possibilities on the one hand, and empirical observation and experimental intervention on the other. But they can also influence each another, corroborating claims, suggesting revisions, and motivating new directions of research. At times these interactions between pure and applied work can be deeply intertwined, as in the momentous developments of twentieth-century physics. Though Husserl did not seem to appreciate how rich these two-way interactions could be—perhaps given the prevalence of psychologistic mistakes in his time—I believe he would have accepted the arguments and evidence outlined above.

Phenomenological psychology as philosophy of mind

In this section I argue that phenomenological psychology in Husserl's sense can be regarded as a form of philosophy of mind, where philosophy of mind is construed broadly to encompass all the mind-related areas of philosophy, including philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. What Husserl means by phenomenological psychology, and how he practices it, fit naturally in the landscape of contemporary philosophy of mind. Moreover, contemporary philosophy of mind and empirical studies of the mind are related in the same way that pure and empirical psychology were related for Husserl: as semi-autonomous pursuits, which proceed independently but can also influence one another.

One way to defend the claim that pure psychology is a form of philosophy of mind is to just observe how often topics in philosophy of mind have been studied in relation to Husserlian phenomenology. Here the evidence is impressive. In a recent review Phil Walsh and I surveyed the literature (Walsh and Yoshimi 2018), and found Husserl's work explicitly discussed in relation to the following topics in philosophy of mind: ontological dependence, metaphysical grounding, intentionality, the twin earth thought experiment, Davidson's anomalous monism, Searle's Chinese Room argument, higher order theories of consciousness, non-conceptual content, representational theories of mind, self-awareness, collective intentionality, embodied cognition, temporal awareness, bodily awareness, cognitive phenomenology, direct realism, perceptual content, and the mind-body problem.[14]

A more systematic approach to the issue is to compare the methods and principles of pure psychology with the methods and principles of contemporary philosophy of mind. This takes us into unsettled areas of meta-philosophy, but we can still make a strong initial case.

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14 Some of the items on this list reflect another, historical link between Husserl's work and philosophy of mind: Husserl was part of the same intellectual tradition that philosophy of mind grew out of (Dummett 1996). He was close with Frege and known to Russell (e.g., there is the story about Russell taking Logical Investigations with him to prison; Milkov 2017); Carnap and Ryle were influenced by Husserl; etc. Some discussion of this shared provenance, with citations to more detailed discussions, is in Walsh and Yoshimi 2018.

First, Husserl distinguishes pure possibilities from a narrower set of possibilities consistent with contingent natural laws.[15] In a similar way, philosophers of mind routinely distinguish nomological possibilities, which are consistent with the actual laws of nature, from metaphysical and logical possibilities, which form a much broader class. For example, philosophical "zombies" (creatures physically like human beings but without consciousness) are often thought to be metaphysically possible but nomologically impossible (McLaughlin and Bennett 2018). Of course, modality is itself a contested topic in contemporary philosophy, and Husserl's concepts of pure vs. "motivated" (and other types of) possibility may or may not map on to contemporary distinctions, but he was clearly engaging in broadly the same kind of reasoning as contemporary philosophers when considering "pure possibilities" beyond what is consistent with our best empirical theories.

Second, eidetic analysis is a form of conceptual analysis philosophers of mind already practice.[16] Though it is not clear what precisely conceptual analysis is, in practice it involves organizing concepts into hierarchical structures, identifying dependencies between concepts, and "testing" to see whether two concepts are separate by trying to imagine a case of one without the other. Husserl did all these things under the banner of eidetic analysis. He developed a complex and fairly extensive hierarchy of essences with his system of regional ontology and tested for distinctness and dependence by varying cases in imagination. He notes, for example, that "Extension can stay the same while color varies indefinitely" and also observes that "color stays the same while extent and figure vary indefinitely" (Husserl 1976, §4). Thus, extension is distinct from color, and color is distinct from extension. He separately argues that each is dependent on the other (we can't imagine color without some extension or extension without some color). He uses similar methods to distinguish matter, quality, sensory content, and other components in intentional acts. Contemporary philosophers of mind and language argue in a similar way and make similar distinctions. For example, recent arguments that cognition has a proprietary non-perceptual phenomenology rely on the following variational argument:

> compare an experience of hearing or reading a sentence without understanding, as when one reads a difficult passage without paying attention to it, and an experience of hearing or reading a sentence with understanding. There is clearly a phenomenal difference between these cases. Siewert argues that the difference is not a difference in verbal or perceptual imagery, since the verbal and perceptual imagery might be the same in both cases. The best explanation of the phenomenal contrast is that thought involves proprietary cognitive phenomenology. Bourget and Mendelovici 2019

Husserl makes similar distinctions in his detailed analysis of meaningful expression in the First Logical Investigation, using the same type of reasoning, e.g., distinguishing meanings from their "imaginative accompaniments" by noting "how vastly they vary while the meanings of the words stay constant" (Husserl 1976, 206).

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15 For example, Husserl says "the proposition 'All bodies are heavy' does not have the unconditional universality of eidetically universal propositions because, according to its sense as a law of Nature, it carries with it a positing of factual existence [...]. In contradistinction, the proposition, 'All material things are extended,' has eidetic validity" (Husserl 1982, 15). The first proposition describes a narrower class of possibilities than the second proposition does.
16 An argument that Husserl's eidetic method can be understood in contemporary analytic terms is in Thomasson 2017.

Third, in both philosophy of mind and Husserlian phenomenology imagined scenarios or thought experiments are used to test conceptual claims. Any general claim that x entails y can be shown false by imagining a possible case (a pure possibility) in which x obtains but y does not. For example, does the concept of a machine that is behaviorally and functionally identical to a conscious human imply phenomenal identity? Searle famously argued "no" by imagining a machine functionally and behaviorally identical to a human (a "Chinese Room"), but which seems obviously not to be conscious. Husserl develops thought experiments in a similar way, with a similar purpose: in Husserlian terms, to construct "possible falsifying states of affairs in free phantasy" (Sowa 2011, 259). For example, one might suppose that any physical system whose state transitions are correlated to a person's mental states would be experienced as an embodiment of that person's mental states. Husserl denies this (perhaps wrongly) by considering the following case:

> Let us imagine a consciousness […] my consciousness, say, which would stand in relation to a locomotive, so that if the locomotive were fed water this [my] consciousness would have the pleasant feeling that we call satiety; if the locomotive were heated, it [I] would have the feeling of warmth, etc. Obviously, the locomotive would not, because of the make-up of such relationships, become "animate organism" for this [my] consciousness. Husserl 2001, 104

Of course, Husserl is not in every respect a prototypical philosopher of mind. His writing style and grand rhetoric would be unusual today. The transcendental dimension of his work is non-standard (though in light of the parallelism claim, it may already be there in philosophy of mind!). The focus on essences is controversial, though again see Thomasson 2017 for an argument that Husserl's method could be reconstructed in contemporary terms. On various issues Husserl defends controversial positions: Platonism, a priori knowledge, a form of epistemic foundationalism, etc.17 But what philosopher doesn't endorse controversial positions? In fact, once Husserl's more exaggerated rhetoric is filtered out, and his ideas are recast in contemporary terms, I think Husserl emerges as a fairly standard philosopher of mind: doing the kinds of things philosophers of mind do and pursuing conceptual analyses that fit naturally within the broad landscape of current philosophy.

Conclusion

I have developed three separate links in this chapter: one between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology; a second between phenomenological and empirical psychology; and a third between phenomenological psychology and philosophy of mind.

The first link describes a close parallel between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, whereby any a priori claim about the mind can be transformed into a claim about the rules in virtue of which objects are constituted for consciousness, and vice versa.

The second link involves two-way relationships of confirmation, correction, and revision between a priori phenomenological research and empirical psychology. These relationships also

17 Though his commitment to these views is far more modest than has traditionally been supposed; for sympathetic reconstructions using contemporary philosophical resources see Thomasson 2017 and Berghofer 2018a.

characterize the project of naturalized phenomenology, which emerged in the 1990s as a way of invigorating both phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, bringing empirical data to one and a richness of subjective perspective to the other.[18] I have at times been deflationary about the project, arguing that phenomenology does not offer anything fundamentally or methodologically new to the scientific study of consciousness (Yoshimi 2016). However, having reviewed Husserl's writings on the topic, I can now frame this same conclusion in a more affirmative way. It's not that we today have nothing new to gain from Husserl's method, it's that we're doing what he was advocating all along.[19]

The third link subsumes phenomenological psychology (and thus, transcendental phenomenology) into philosophy of mind, again, construed broadly to include related areas like philosophy of cognitive science.

These linkages suggest that philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science have a transcendental dimension. I did not anticipate this idea when I began work on this chapter, but it has grown on me. By further clarifying (via conceptual analyses) the computational and dynamical framework in virtue of which agents make sense of the world, these areas promote the transcendental project of understanding the conditions under which a world appears in the first place. Philosophers in these areas are developing our potential to understand, with greater precision than ever before, the rules governing the manifestation of being out of the flux of conscious experience.[20]

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18 Here is how Francisco Varela (1996) described "The Working Hypothesis of Neurophenomenology": "Phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their counterparts in cognitive science relate to each other through reciprocal constraints" (343). Owen Flanagan describes a method of "triangulation" whereby theories in phenomenology, neuroscience, and cognitive science are "rendered coherent, meshed, and brought into reflective equilibrium, into a state where theory and data fit coherently together" (Flanagan 1997, 100).

19 Though differences remain. Husserl was enthusiastic about phenomenological psychology's potential to influence empirical research, but was reticent and cautious about empirical psychology's ability to influence phenomenological psychology, or in contemporary terms, philosophy of mind. My sense is that this pattern of enthusiasm is reversed in contemporary discussions.

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